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Abstract 
Low beta stocks have offered a combination of low risk and high returns. We decompose the 
anomaly into micro and macro components. The micro component comes from the selection of 
low  beta  stocks.  The  macro  component  comes  from  the  selection  of  low  beta  countries  or 
industries. The two parts both contribute to the low beta anomaly, with important implications 
for the construction of managed volatility portfolios. 
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In an efficient market, investors earn a higher return only to the extent that they bear higher risk. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of a positive risk-return relationship, this pattern has been 
surprisingly hard to find in the data, dating at least to Black (1972). For example, sorting stocks 
using measures of market beta or volatility shows just the opposite. Panel A of Figure 1 shows 
that, from 1968 through 2012 in the U.S. equity market, portfolios of low risk stocks deliver on 
the promise of lower risk as planned, but with surprisingly higher average returns. A dollar 
invested in the lowest risk portfolio grew to $81.66 while a dollar invested in the highest risk 
portfolio grew to only $9.76. A similar inverse relationship between risk and return appears from 
1989 through 2012 in a sample of up to 31 developed equity markets shown in Panel B of Figure 
1. A dollar invested in the lowest risk portfolio of global equities grew to $7.23. Meanwhile a 
dollar invested in the highest risk portfolio of global equities grew to only $1.20 at the end of the 
period. This so-called low risk anomaly suggests a very basic form of market inefficiency. 
Shiller (2001) credits Paul Samuelson with the idea of separating market efficiency into 
two types. Micro efficiency concerns the relative pricing of individual stocks, while macro 
efficiency refers to the pricing of the market as a whole. Broadly speaking, inefficiencies can be 
examined at different levels of aggregation: at the individual stock level, at the industry level, at 
the country level, or, in some cases, for global equity markets.  
Samuelson (1998) conjectured that capital markets have “come a long way, baby, in two 
hundred years toward micro efficiency of markets: Black-Scholes option pricing, indexing of 
portfolio diversification, and so forth. But there is no persuasive evidence, either from economic 
history or avant garde theorizing, that macro market inefficiency is trending toward extinction.” 
At the heart of the difference is the fact that individual securities often have close substitutes. As 
Scholes (1972) shows, the availability of close substitutes facilitates low risk micro arbitrage and 2 
 
pins down relative prices, if there are no practical limits on arbitrage. Industry and country 
portfolios have fewer close substitutes, and the equity market as a whole has none. So, individual 
stocks, in this view, are priced more efficiently relative to each other than they are in absolute 
terms. Of course, limits to arbitrage are real and substitutes are never perfect, so even 
Samuelson’s hypothesis is one of relative not absolute efficiency.  
In the context of the low risk anomaly, Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) emphasize 
the important constraint that long only, fixed-benchmark mandates impose on micro arbitrage. 
Many institutional investors are judged not by total return relative to total risk, but instead on 
active return relative to active risk, or benchmark tracking error. Such benchmark oriented 
mandates discourage investment in low risk stocks. Despite their low risk, these stocks only 
become attractive relative to the tracking error they create when their anticipated return exceeds 
the benchmark in absolute terms. There are also limits on macro arbitrage. Market aggregates do 
not have close substitutes, and so macro arbitrage – in the usual sense of simultaneously buying 
low and selling fundamentally similar securities high – is largely infeasible. Standard 
institutional mandates and risk management practices also play a role here, typically limiting the 
size of benchmark relative country or industry exposures or eliminating them entirely through 
narrow mandates that identify a single country index as the benchmark return. French and 
Poterba (1991) and more recently Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) document a home bias, 
for example, showing that individuals often do not invest across borders. 
One way of examining the relative efficiency of markets at different levels of aggregation 
is to aggregate or disaggregate a known anomaly into its micro and macro components. An 
important limitation of this approach is that anomalies change their meaning at different levels of 
aggregation. Ratios of fundamental to market value capture misvaluation at the individual stock 3 
 
level, as in Basu (1977). But, Lewellen (1999) finds little contribution from the industry level, 
where differences in valuation ratios might reflect varying approaches to caplitalizing investment 
or reporting earnings. Meanwhile, Fama and French (1998) find that predictive power reappears 
at even higher levels of aggregation in cross-country regressions. Likewise, Kothari and Shanken 
(1997) find that time series comparisons of valuation ratios for equity markets as a whole are 
also useful. Unlike value, beta retains the same meaning at the stock level and in country and 
industry portfolios, though it loses some of its variability. Its usefulness runs out for the market 
as a whole, where it is 1.0 by definition. Another limitation of aggregation is that econometric 
tests typically lose power to identify inefficiency. So, it is important to consider economic and 
statistical significance. 
In the spirit of Samuelson, we decompose the low risk anomaly into its micro and macro 
components. The pattern of low risk and high return can in principle come either from the macro 
selection of lower risk countries and industries or from the micro selection of low risk stocks 
within those countries and industries. We separate the two effects by forming long-short 
portfolios of stocks that first hold constant ex ante country or industry level risk and examine 
stock selection. Then, we hold constant ex ante stock level risk and examine country or industry 
selection. What we find in a sample of 29 US industries and up to 31 developed countries is that 
micro and macro selection both contribute to the low risk anomaly, albeit for two surprisingly 
different reasons.  
The micro selection of stocks leads to a significant reduction in risk, with only a modest 
difference in return. Even holding constant country or industry level risk, there is ample 
opportunity to form lower risk portfolios through stock selection, and these lower risk portfolios 
do not suffer lower returns. High risk stocks can be distinctly identified within the utility industry 4 
 
or in Japan, for example, but they have similar raw returns on average when compared to low 
risk stocks in the same industry or country grouping. This evidence supports the notion of limits 
to micro arbitrage in low risk stocks that come from traditional fixed-benchmark mandates. 
Meanwhile, the macro selection of countries in particular leads to increases in return, with only 
modest differences in risk. Countries that we identify as high risk ex ante are only modestly 
higher risk going forward, but they have distinctly lower returns. This evidence supports the 
limits to macro arbitrage across countries and industries. 
Other researchers have examined the question of micro versus macro efficiency. Jung and 
Shiller (2005) show that dividend yields predict the growth in dividends at the firm level, but not 
at higher levels of aggregation. A higher dividend yield should intuitively be associated with 
lower growth in dividends, and indeed across firms this is true, suggesting a degree of micro 
efficiency. Somewhat pathologically, higher aggregate dividend yields predict higher, not lower, 
dividend growth, suggesting macro inefficiency. This parallels the more in-depth studies by 
Campbell (1991) and Vuolteenaho (2002) of variance decompositions of stock returns using 
valuation ratios. Lamont and Stein (2006) extend this logic to corporate finance. Corporate 
financing activities like new issuance and stock-financed mergers, which are in part designed to 
take advantage of market inefficiency, display greater sensitivity to aggregate movements in 
value than they do to individual stock price changes.  
Decomposing the low risk anomaly is a particularly appealing new avenue, because beta 
retains its meaning in country and industry aggregations. Unlike beta, value or momentum, for 
example have no ex ante, risk-based theory of return predictability. So, if value, to take an 
example, has greater predictive power within industries than across industries, little is revealed 
about micro versus macro efficiency. It may simply be differences in accounting conventions, for 5 
 
example, across industries, which make relative value comparisons with financial statement data 
easier within industries. 
Our results on the decomposition of the low risk anomaly into micro and macro effects 
have investment implications for plan sponsors and individuals alike. For individuals, it suggests 
that trying to exploit the mispricing through industry and sector funds or ETFs will only get you 
so far. While such a strategy can gain exposure to the macro effects, it cannot exploit 
considerable risk reduction available in micro stock selection. For institutional investors and plan 
sponsors, it suggests that perfunctory approaches to risk modeling and overly constrained 
mandates will not fully appreciate the benefits of the macro effects. Broad mandates with loose 
constraints and thoughtful techniques to modeling risk will do the most to exploit the low risk 
anomaly. 
 
The Low Risk Anomaly 
A preliminary step is confirming that the low risk anomaly is present in two sources of stock 
return data that are convenient for our decomposition. We sort stocks into quintiles according to 
ex ante market beta and form five capitalization-weighted, buy-and-hold portfolios. Theory 
predicts a positive relationship between risk and return. Under the Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, the relationship is linear and the slope between contemporaneously measured 
market beta and returns is equal to the overall market risk premium. Fortunately, the low risk 
anomaly does not hinge on elaborate estimations, because the empirical slope has the wrong 
sign. 6 
 
For our analysis of industries within the U.S., we use data from the Center for Research 
in Securities Prices (CRSP). From CRSP we collect the monthly returns of all U.S. shares for the 
period January 1963 through December 2012. We also collect the corresponding data on market 
capitalizations to form capitalization-weighted portfolios. Each month and for each stock, we 
estimate a market beta using the previous 60 months of excess returns. Stocks that have fewer 
than 60 prior monthly returns are included if they have a history of at least 12 months. 
For our analysis of countries across the developed world, we use data from Standard & 
Poor’s Broad Market Index (BMI). From BMI we collect monthly and weekly returns and 
market capitalizations for common stocks for the period July 1989 through December 2012. The 
raw dataset contains a very small number of suspicious returns, less than –100% and greater than 
1,000%, and we exclude these observations from our analysis. Market betas are estimated using 
the excess return of the capitalization-weighted aggregate of all stocks in the sample as the 
market portfolio. Returns are measured in U.S. dollars, and the risk-free rate is the U.S. Treasury 
bill rate from Ken French’s website. Each month and for each stock, we estimate a market beta 
using the previous 60 weeks of returns. Stocks that have fewer than 60 prior weekly returns are 
included if they have a history of at least 12 weeks. We opt for a more dynamic estimation of 
betas in the BMI. The overall sample is shorter and a five-year period to estimate initial betas is 
more costly. Neither monthly nor weekly country betas perform particularly well in predicting 
future country portfolio betas, but weekly measures are a marginal improvement. 
Figure 1 depicts the low risk anomaly graphically. In the CRSP data in Panel A, a $1 
investment in the low risk quintile portfolio in 1968 compounds to $81.66 by the end of 2012. A 
$1 investment in the high risk quintile compounds to only $9.76. Over the shorter history of the 7 
 
BMI data, a $1 investment in 1989 compounded to $7.23 in the low risk quintile and $1.20 in the 
high risk quintile. 
To understand the statistical significance of these results, we perform a simple test in 
Table 1. We regress the returns of each of the resulting five portfolios, measured in excess of 
U.S. Treasury bill returns, on the aggregate market excess return, to find the portfolio’s full-
period ex post market beta and CAPM alpha. The first and third columns in Table 1 report the 
betas and alphas, respectively, of five CRSP portfolios. The second and fourth columns in Table 
1 report the same calculations for the BMI data. For example, the portfolio formed from the 
CRSP stocks with the lowest betas realized a beta of 0.59 over the full period, 1968-2012. The 
portfolio formed from the CRSP stocks with the highest betas realized a beta of 1.61. The 
difference between these betas of 1.02 is both large and significant, with a t-statistic of 23.99. 
These results suggest that betas estimated from past returns are strong predictors of future betas. 
More importantly, the third column in Table 1 reports the alphas for five CRSP, beta-
sorted portfolios. The difference in risk-adjusted performance is stark. The least risky portfolio 
formed from the lowest beta stocks has an alpha of 2.27% and a t-statistic 2.16, while the riskiest 
portfolio formed from the highest beta stocks has a CAPM alpha of –4.49% and t-statistic of   
–2.70. The difference between these alphas is economically large at 6.76% and statistically 
significant with a t-statistic of 2.84. It is this last result that summarizes the low-risk anomaly: 
low risk stocks outperform high risk stocks on a risk-adjusted basis.  
Despite a shorter history, the low risk anomaly appears to be stronger in the BMI data. 
The fourth column in Table 1 reports the alphas for five BMI, beta-sorted portfolios. The 
difference between the alphas is larger at 9.24%, with a t-statistic of 2.71. This is not quite an 8 
 
independent test of the low risk anomaly, because the samples overlap in time and in securities 
with the U.S. included in both. However, when we exclude the two largest countries, the U.S. 
and Japan, we obtain similar results both here and in the decomposition below. Our aim is to use 
data, with the highest quality and deepest history, for separate industry and country 
decompositions. We sacrifice cross country variation to double the history of our industry 
decomposition, and we sacrifice history to have a stable cross-country decomposition. 
These preliminary results align with the literature, which dates to Black (1972), Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Haugen and Heins (1975). More recently, Fama and French (1992), 
Falkenstein (1994) and others have observed a flat or even negative empirical relationship 
between risk and return. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009) focused more on volatility 
sorts, pointing out the poor performance of the highest volatility quantiles. Bali, Cakici, and 
Whitelaw (2011) develop a related measure of lottery-like risk. Hong and Sraer (2012) 
incorporate speculative motives to trade into an asset pricing model to explain the low risk 
anomaly while Frazzini and Pederson (2010) focus on the implications of leverage and 
margining and extend this to other asset classes. There is roughly a risk return tradeoff across 
long histories of asset class returns, where stocks outperform bonds, for example. But, within 
asset classes, the lowest risk portfolios have higher Sharpe ratios. Baker and Haugen (2012) and 
Blitz, Pang and van Vliet (2012) document the outperformance of low risk stocks in various 
markets throughout the developed and emerging world. None of these authors focus on the 
decomposition of the anomaly into micro and macro effects. In a current working paper, Asness, 
Frazzini, and Pedersen (2013) apply a different methodology to examine the contributions to the 
low risk anomaly of the industry and stock selection pieces. Their results are consistent with our 
own decomposition at the industry level. 9 
 
Explanations have emphasized a combination of behavioral demand and the limits to 
arbitrage, including limited borrowing capacity and the delegation of stock selection, to explain 
the low risk anomaly. Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) survey three behavioral explanations: 
lottery preferences, representativeness, and overconfidence. We omit a detailed review of these 
here to save space. In terms of constraints, Black (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2010) 
emphasize leverage. Karceski (2002) and Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) focus on the 
effects of intermediation. While Karceski describes the interaction between high beta strategies 
and the capture of mutual fund flows, Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler derive the implications of 
fixed benchmark strategies for low risk stocks using the framework in Brennan (1993). It is 
worth noting that these stories suggest both the overvaluation of high risk stocks and the 
undervaluation of low risk stocks. Our focus here is not to disentangle the absolute mispricing, 
but rather to examine the relative mispricing in Table 1. Assuming the behavioral demand 
applies to both individual stocks and market aggregates, a decomposition of the low risk 
anomaly can in principle help to understand the extent of the limits to micro and macro arbitrage, 
and the role of fixed benchmarks.  
 
Variations on the Low Risk Anomaly 
There are several important footnotes to this analysis so far. The first involves the rate of 
turnover and liquidity in the low risk portfolios. The second involves the benchmark model used 
for computing risk-adjusted returns, or alphas. The third is the measure of risk itself, which has 
varied in the literature. 10 
 
Beta turnover and liquidity. Some measures of risk require high frequency rebalancing. 
For example, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009) and Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw 
(2011) measure idiosyncratic risk over relatively short horizons. The results in Table 1 do not 
require much turnover, by contrast. For the CRSP sample, this is intuitive. The betas are 
computed using 60 months of data, so changes in beta estimates from month to month are small. 
The probability of staying in the first or fifth quintiles from one month to the next is greater than 
95%, and the probability of moving out of the top or bottom two quintiles from the first or the 
fifth is less than 0.5%. Moreover, lagged betas show a similar ability to predict monthly returns, 
so turnover is of limited value. Table 2 repeats the analysis in the third column of Table 1 using 
betas lagged up to 12 months. Economic and statistical significance remains almost unchanged. 
In terms of liquidity, Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) show that Figure 1 appears more 
robust when attention is restricted to the largest 1,000 stocks in CRSP. While we have not 
modeled transaction costs as in Li, Sullivan, and Garcia-Feijoo (2013), the combination of these 
two facts, low turnover and the existence of the anomaly in large capitalization stocks, suggests 
this particular low beta strategy was an implementable one over this time period. 
Benchmark models. There are several possibilities in the literature for benchmarking 
returns. We chose to focus on CAPM regressions for two reasons. The first is that we can 
parsimoniously show the impact on both risk and alpha in double sorts. With three or four 
measures of risk, this becomes complicated. Below, we show how firm, industry, and country 
level information affects portfolio risk reduction and risk-adjusted returns, which works nicely 
with CAPM betas. The second and related reason is that beta is a theoretically motivated 
measure of risk. Low beta stocks and portfolios of low beta stocks are less risky in the sense that 
their marginal contribution to the overall volatility of most diversified portfolios is negative. 11 
 
Size, value, and momentum are other anomalies that were discovered because of their return 
properties not because of any clear risk-based theory.  
Even if size and value can also be considered anomalous, it is still useful to ask whether 
beta sorts represent a different anomaly from value and size. As it turns out, low risk alphas are 
still statistically significant with controls for value and size. The alpha in Table 1 retains its 
statistical significance, but the point estimate drops from 6.76 to 4.08. What this says is that there 
is incremental information in beta that is not fully contained in value, and also that some of the 
alpha in low risk strategies can be captured through value. This is not too surprising, in that any 
explanation where low risk stocks are undervalued predicts that crude value measures absorb 
some of the low risk anomaly. Like value, momentum helps to explain some of the performance 
of low beta strategies. Momentum alone does not eliminate the low beta outperformance, but it 
also reduces its economic and statistical power somewhat. However, there is even less reason to 
include momentum in the benchmark. While the correlation between value or size and beta is 
stable, the connection between momentum and beta is not. With large market moves, momentum 
portfolios inherit beta risks of one type or the other, high or low. Occasionally the extreme 
quintiles overlap, and occasionally they contain a disjoint set of stocks. So, the low volatility 
anomaly has no routine, theoretical, and positive exposure to momentum as a risk factor. Rather, 
it is momentum that occasionally has low or high market risk. Daniel and Moskowitz (2013) 
show that momentum crashes have occurred disproportionately following major market declines, 
when past losers are high beta and past winners are low beta. These are periods when low beta 
stocks have also underperformed high beta stocks. This strikes us as an interesting feature of 
momentum, but not a reason to change the benchmark. 12 
 
Measures of risk. Beta is only one measure of risk that is associated with a broader low 
risk anomaly. The reason we focus on beta is that any portfolio beta, including industry or 
country portfolios,  is a simple weighted average combination of the individual security betas 
contained in that portfolio, at their portfolio weights. The same cannot be said of the portfolio 
idiosyncratic volatility. The full covariance matrix of the individual securities is needed to get 
from security level risk to portfolio level risk. Nonetheless, a decomposition of idiosyncratic risk, 
given its ability to predict stock level returns is an interesting robustness check. The main 
choices in measuring volatility are choosing the benchmark and choosing the time horizon. We 
focus on a low frequency measure of idiosyncratic volatility that draws from the same CAPM 
regressions described above to estimate beta. Although we do not match the approach in Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009), the resulting portfolios are more stable, with lower 
transaction costs in implementation, and the interpretation is simpler, because the estimation 
window and the regression specification are identical.  
 
A Decomposition of Micro and Macro Effects in 29 Industries 
We begin with a decomposition of the low risk anomaly into separate industry and stock level 
effects. It is worth keeping in mind the statistical significance of the basic anomaly. There are 
economically large differences in both risk and risk-adjusted returns, but the statistical 
significance of the return differences is more modest, suggesting that we will have somewhat 
less power to decompose these effects definitively, and we will focus on economic effects more 
than statistical significance. 13 
 
We group firms into industries using their primary SIC memberships, as identified by 
CRSP. Because four-digit SIC codes divide the sample into groups that are sometimes too small 
to obtain robust estimates of risk and return, we use Ken French’s somewhat broader industry 
groupings that build on Fama and French (1997). Our industry definitions are to a degree 
subjective. For example, on Ken French’s website, there are definitions that group stocks into 5, 
10, 12, 17, 30, 38, 48, and 49 industries. In the analysis following, we use the definitions for the 
30 industries, dropping the “Other” category to net 29, and we have checked that the results are 
not materially different using the 12-industry definitions.  
Two considerations motivate our use of 30 industries. First, the 12 industry definitions 
leave a substantial subset of stocks categorized as “Other”, while the 30 industry definitions 
assign a much smaller subset to this classification. Second, our methodology groups stocks into 
quintiles based on industry betas, and it seemed unnecessarily coarse to use 12 industry 
definitions to assign stocks to five quintiles. On the other hand, when there are more industries, 
there are fewer stocks per industry and the potential problems of using four-digit SIC codes 
emerge, so we did not push beyond 30 industries into finer industry definitions. Using fewer 
industry groupings does not necessarily tilt us in favor of finding a more robust micro effect. 
What matters is the link between estimated and realized industry betas, and the robustness of this 
relationship initially increases with the number of industries but eventually decreases as the 
estimation error associated with thin cells becomes relevant. 
The low risk anomaly across industries. Table 3 is a prelude to the decomposition of 
the low risk anomaly, repeating the analysis in the first and third columns of Table 1 with 
industry betas in place of stock betas. A stock’s industry beta is the beta of the capitalization-
weighted average of the betas of the stocks within the industry: on each estimation date, the 14 
 
industry beta is the same for each stock in a given industry. Each month, we use quintile 
breakpoints to assign an approximately equal number of stocks to each of five portfolios using 
industry betas. All stocks in a given industry are assigned to a single quintile portfolio.  We again 
capitalization-weight the stocks in each portfolio to find portfolio returns, and we estimate 
market betas and CAPM alphas. The first column suggests that historic, ex ante industry beta is 
able to predict ex post realized stock betas, but not as well as historic stock betas. In this column, 
the difference between the ex post betas of the high and low portfolios is –0.60, with a t-statistic 
of –16.69, roughly two-thirds of the spread achieved using stock betas in Table 1. Similarly, 
compared to the difference in ex post alphas using stocks’ own betas, the second column reports 
a smaller and marginally significant difference in ex post alphas of 3.65%, with a t-statistic of 
1.80. In short, using only information about industry betas and no stock level information 
delivers a reasonable fraction of the risk reduction and risk-adjusted return improvement of stock 
level sorts. 
Decomposing the low risk anomaly between stocks and industries. We now turn to 
the main question: To what degree do macro effects contribute to the low risk anomaly? In this 
case, industries represent the macro dimension of the anomaly. To understand the separate 
contributions of industry selection and stock selection within industries, we combine the 
independent quintile sorts of Table 1 and Table 3 into a double sort methodology. Each month, 
we use independent quintile breakpoints to assign each stock to a portfolio based on its own beta 
and its industry beta. We capitalization-weight the stocks in the resulting 25 portfolios. 
We are interested in the contribution of stock level risk measures, once industry risk has 
been taken into account, and we are interested in the contribution of industry level risk measures, 
once stock level risk has been taken into account. We can only answer these questions to the 15 
 
extent that these sorts do not lead to the same exact division of the CRSP sample. Figure 2 plots 
the fraction of stocks in each of the resulting 25 portfolios in Panel A and the fraction of market 
capitalization in Panel B. If these sorts led to the same division of the CRSP sample, all of the 
firms and the market capitalization would lie on the diagonal. The plots show that the two effects 
overlap considerably, especially when measured in terms of market capitalization. This is 
intuitive, as large capitalization firms are likely to have measures of risk that are closer to the 
capitalization-weighted industry beta. The plots also show that we will have some ability to 
separate the two effects.  
As a side note, we have also considered dependent sorts, in addition to the independent 
sorts described below. We first sort stocks into quintiles using industry beta. Within each 
quintile, we then sort using stock level beta. This forces an equal number of stocks into each of 
the 25 portfolios. Our findings are largely similar using this approach, for both industries and the 
country analysis described below.  
For each of the 25 independent double-sorted portfolios, we estimate an ex post beta and 
CAPM alpha over the full period. Table 4 reports results. The left columns report betas, and the 
right columns report alphas. In the left columns, betas are widely dispersed and tend to increase 
from top to bottom and from left to right. For example, the first data column reports the betas of 
portfolios formed from stocks in low-beta industries: reading down the column, portfolio betas 
increase monotonically from 0.54 to 1.48 within this subsample. Similarly, the fifth data column 
reports betas of portfolios formed from stocks in high-beta industries, and the range of portfolio 
betas within this subsample also is large, increasing from 0.87 to 1.64. By contrast, rows display 
much less variation in portfolio betas. For example, the “Low” row, which forms portfolios from 
stocks with the lowest betas, shows that betas range from 0.54 to 0.87 for stocks in the lowest 16 
 
and highest beta industries. Among high risk stocks in the “High” row, the industry effect is even 
smaller. In this subsample, stocks in the highest-beta industries have an average beta of 1.64 
compared to an average beta of 1.48 for stocks in the lowest-beta industries. 
The statistics at the bottom of the panel summarize these patterns. The first is a pure 
industry effect, measured as the average of the differences between high beta and low beta 
industries, controlling for stock-level risk. This is the average of the differences reported in the 
“Low – High” column. The second is a pure stock effect, measured as the average of the 
differences between high beta and low beta stocks, controlling for industry risk. Again, this is the 
average of the differences reported in the “Low – High” row. Our ability to find low risk 
portfolios through the selection of low risk stocks within industries, at a –0.82 reduction in beta, 
is about four times as large as our ability to find low risk portfolios through the selection of low 
risk industries within stock risk groups. These results are consistent with stock level beta, as 
estimated from historical data, being a much better predictor of future beta than industry beta. 
However, both a stock level historical beta and its industry level historical beta, each relative to 
the other, have incremental predictive power for future beta. 
The t-statistics in Table 4 are computed taking into account the empirical covariance 
among the 25 double-sorted portfolios. To be specific, we use a seemingly unrelated regression 
model that allows regression errors to be contemporaneously correlated among the 25 
regressions, but that assumes zero autocorrelations or cross-autocorrelations. Measures of risk 
and differences in risk are highly statistically significant. Differences in return are harder to 
detect in the data. 17 
 
The right panel of Table 4 reports alphas for the double-sorted portfolios. Alphas tend to 
decrease from top to bottom and from left to right. The “Low – High” column reports differences 
in alphas between stocks in low-beta and high-beta industries, controlling for the stocks’ own 
betas. The first summary statistic reports the average of these differences, a pure industry effect 
of 1.53%. Similarly, the “Low – High” row reports the differences in alphas between low beta 
stocks and high beta stocks, controlling for industry beta. The second summary statistic reports 
the average of these differences, a pure stock effect of 4.44%. Historically, both industry 
selection and stock selection have made material contributions to the outperformance of low-risk 
investing strategies. We cannot rule out that the industry effect happened by chance, though our 
power to reject this null hypothesis is limited. 
The beta and alpha estimates in Table 4 suggest that pure stock alpha – the micro effect – 
and pure industry alpha – the macro effect – arise for different reasons. The pure industry alpha 
of 1.53% is present in spite of a small cross-industry beta difference of –0.22. By implication, the 
industry alpha obtains as a consequence of cross industry portfolios exhibiting differences in 
returns, with modest differences in risk. In contrast, the pure stock alpha of 4.44% is present 
alongside a dramatic difference in within industry beta of –0.82. By implication, the stock alpha 
obtains as a consequence of within industry portfolios exhibiting material differences in risk, 
with a more limited difference in returns.  
 
A Decomposition of Micro and Macro Effects in up to 31 Developed Country Markets 
Another way to slice the data is geographically. Just as some industries such as utilities and 
health care are less sensitive to global equity markets, some regions and countries are also 18 
 
thought to have different risk properties. Japan, for example, has a low correlation with global 
equity markets in its recent history. Next, we turn to decomposing the low risk anomaly into 
country and stock effects. 
Developed BMI includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the 
sample of developed markets. In addition, several more countries are included or excluded at 
some point during the sample. To avoid any lookahead bias, we follow the point-in-time S&P 
decisions and include these countries in the developed market sample whenever S&P labels them 
as such. These are the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and South Korea. Each month and for each stock we estimate a stock beta 
with respect to the global equity market using the previous 60 weeks of returns, measured from 
Wednesday to Wednesday. Stocks with a shorter history than 60 weeks are included if they have 
at least 12 weeks of returns. We define the global equity market as the capitalization-weighted 
average return of the entire BMI developed market sample. We also measure an analogous 
country beta. Each stock is mapped to a country, and the stock's country beta is the 
capitalization-weighted average of the betas of each stock within the country: on each estimation 
date, the country beta is the same for each stock in a given country.  
The low risk anomaly across countries. In what follows, we repeat the industry analysis 
for countries in the BMI sample. As before, Table 5 is a prelude to the decomposition of the low 
risk anomaly, repeating the analysis in the second and fourth columns of Table 1 with country 
betas in place of stock betas. The first column suggests that historic, ex ante country beta is able 
to predict ex post realized stock betas, but like industries not as well as historic stock betas. In 19 
 
this column, the difference between the ex post betas of the high and low portfolios is  
–0.55, with a t-statistic of –8.78, roughly half of the spread achieved using stock betas in Table 1. 
The alpha differences are somewhat stronger than industry sorts. The second column shows a 
difference in ex post alphas that is smaller than Table 1, but still reasonably large at 6.86 with a 
t-statistic of 1.97. In short, using only information about country betas and no stock level 
information delivers roughly half the risk reduction and about two-thirds of the risk-adjusted 
return improvement of stock level sorts. This combination of a substantial risk-adjusted return 
difference and lower risk reduction is a preview of the decomposition. As we will see, unlike the 
industry analysis, there is something extra in the country beta sorts, in terms of total returns, that 
is not captured in the stock beta sorts of Table 1. 
Decomposing the low risk anomaly between stocks and countries. We now ask to 
what degree macro effects contribute to the low risk anomaly, but, in this case, countries 
represent the macro dimension of the anomaly. To understand the separate contributions of 
country selection and stock selection within countries, we repeat the independent quintile sorts of 
Table 4 in Table 6. Each month, we use independent quintile breakpoints to assign each stock to 
a portfolio based on its own beta and its country beta. We capitalization-weight the stocks in the 
resulting 25 portfolios.  
We are interested in the contribution of stock level risk measures, once country risk has 
been taken into account, and we are interested in the contribution of country level risk measures, 
once stock level risk has been taken into account. We can only answer these questions to the 
extent that these sorts do not lead to the same exact division of the BMI sample. Figure 3 plots 
the fraction of stocks in each of the resulting 25 portfolios in Panel A and the fraction of market 
capitalization in Panel B. If these sorts led to the same division of the BMI sample, all of the 20 
 
firms and the market capitalization would lie on the diagonal. The plots again show that the two 
effects overlap considerably, especially when measured in terms of market capitalization.  
For each of the 25 independent double-sorted portfolios, we estimate an ex post beta and 
CAPM alpha over the full period. In Table 6, the left columns report betas, and the right columns 
report alphas. In the left columns, betas are widely dispersed and tend to increase from top to 
bottom and from left to right. For example, the first data column reports the betas of portfolios 
formed from stocks in low-beta countries: reading down the column, portfolio betas range from 
0.52 to 1.62 within this subsample. Similarly, the fifth data column reports betas of portfolios 
formed from stocks in high-beta countries, and the range of portfolio betas within this subsample 
also is large, from 0.65 to 1.67. By contrast, rows display even less variation in portfolio betas 
than industry sorts delivered. For example, the “Low” row, which forms portfolios from stocks 
with the lowest betas, shows that betas range from 0.52 to 0.65 for stocks in the lowest and 
highest beta countries.  
The statistics at the bottom of the panel summarize these patterns. The first is a pure 
country effect, measured as the average of the differences between high beta and low beta 
countries, controlling for stock-level risk. The second is a pure stock effect, measured as the 
average of the differences between high beta and low beta stocks, controlling for country risk. 
Our ability to find low risk portfolios through the selection of low risk stocks within countries, at 
a –1.01 reduction in beta, is 50 times as large as our ability to find low risk portfolios through the 
selection of low risk countries within stock risk groups. These results are consistent with stock 
level beta, as estimated from historical data, being a much better predictor of future beta than its 
country beta. This time the incremental predictive power of country level historical beta is closer 
to zero, in both economic and statistical terms. 21 
 
The right panel of Table 1 reports alphas for the double-sorted portfolios. Alphas tend to 
decrease from top to bottom and from left to right. The average of these differences within each 
row is a pure country effect of 6.22%. The average of these differences within each column is a 
pure stock effect of 5.40%. Both are statistically significant at the 10% level. That is, historical 
data suggest the low risk anomaly is present both within and across countries. 
In short, the same picture emerges with countries as we saw with industries. The beta and 
alpha estimates in Table 6 suggest that pure stock alpha – the micro effects – and pure country 
alpha – the macro effect – arise for different reasons. The pure country alpha of 6.22% is present 
in spite of no cross-country beta difference. By implication, the country alpha obtains as a 
consequence of cross country portfolios exhibiting material differences in returns, with modest 
differences in risk. In contrast, the pure stock alpha of 5.40% is present alongside a dramatic 
difference in within country beta of –1.01. By implication, the stock alpha obtains as a 
consequence of within country portfolios exhibiting material differences in risk, with modest 
differences in returns. 
 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
The same analysis can be done with idiosyncratic risk instead of beta. But, the process 
requires a bit more decision making. In particular, the industry contribution could be measured 
with the idiosyncratic risk of aggregated industry portfolios, or it could be measured with the 
average of firm-level idiosyncratic risk within the industry. The first measures the risk of the 
industry, the other measures how risky the stocks are within the industry. We opt for the second 
approach for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, our intuition is that the 22 
 
idiosyncratic volatility of the industry average portfolio would perhaps be lower than all of the 
individual stocks, because of the benefits of diversification, and it might be mechanically related 
to the number of firms within each industry or country. Theoretically, we view the demand 
arising at the stock level, so that an industry with lots of high risk stocks generates more 
aggregate demand than an industry with few.  
This foreshadows what we find in the data. We repeat Table 4 and Table 6 using 
idiosyncratic risk instead of beta, and we show the summary results in Table 7. The first row of 
each panel is a pure industry effect or a pure country effect, measured as the average of the 
differences between high and low idiosyncratic risk industries and countries, controlling for 
stock-level idiosyncratic risk. The second row of each panel is a pure stock effect, measured as 
the average of the differences between high and low idiosyncratic risk stocks, controlling for 
industry or country idiosyncratic risk. What we find is that the idiosyncratic risk effect is almost 
entirely a micro phenomenon. 96% comes from a pure stock effect in the CRSP industry sample. 
86% comes from a pure stock effect in the BMI country sample. Idiosyncratic risk is like 
valuation ratios, in the sense that the intuition does not necessarily aggregate. What matters is 
whether a stock is risky relative to a stock in its category more than the category average. 
 
Conclusion: Samuelson’s Dictum and the Implications for Managed Volatility Strategies 
The decomposition of the low risk anomaly has both theoretical and practical implications. The 
superior performance of lower risk stocks that is evident in Figure 1 in both U.S. and 
international markets is a very basic form of market inefficiency. It has both micro and macro 
components. The micro component arises from the selection of lower risk stocks, holding 23 
 
country and industry risk constant. The macro component arises from the selection of lower risk 
industries and countries, holding stock level risk constant.  
In theory, market inefficiency arises from some combination of less than fully rational 
demand and the limits to arbitrage. Shiller (2001) has attributed to Samuelson the hypothesis that 
macro inefficiencies are quantitatively larger than micro efficiencies. In contrast, we find that the 
contribution to the low risk anomaly is of similar magnitude across micro and macro effects. 
While stock selection leads to higher alpha through a combination of significant risk reduction 
with modest return improvements, country selection leads to higher alpha through a combination 
of significant return improvements and modest risk reduction. Industry selection is relatively 
modest and the extra alpha cannot be distinguished from zero statistically. We view this as 
affirmation of a modified version of Samuelson’s dictum. Namely, micro efficiency holds only 
up to the limits of arbitrage. The constraint of fixed benchmark mandates makes low risk stocks 
unattractive to many institutional investors. Macro inefficiency is present for countries more so 
than for industries, perhaps because arbitrage is more limited across countries than across 
industries. 
The absence of material risk reduction from the macro selection of industries and 
countries suggests two things. The first is that pure country or industry risk prediction is hard, 
compared to predicting the relative risk of individual stocks. The second is that, to the extent this 
anomaly arises because of investor demand for high risk aggregations of stocks, this demand is 
in large part backward looking. The pattern of returns suggests that behavioral demand tilts 
towards sectors and countries that have experienced relatively higher risk in the past. 24 
 
In practice, the incremental value of industry and country selection, even holding stock 
level risk constant, suggests that the use of a risk model in beta estimation that includes fixed 
country and industry effects is preferable to simple stock level sorts on beta or volatility. This 
has been especially true in global portfolios, where the incremental value of estimating country 
level risk was significant. Moreover, because country and industry exposures have generated 
incremental alpha, a global mandate with somewhat relaxed country and industry constraints 
would have delivered higher risk-adjusted returns. 
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Figure  1.  Cumulative  returns  of  five  portfolios  formed  on  stocks’  prior  betas  for  U.S.  1968-2012  and 
developed markets 1989-2012. At the beginning of each month, we use quintile breakpoints to assign each stock in 
the CRSP database (U.S., Panel A) and in S&P’s Broad Market Index (BMI) database (developed markets, Panel B) 
to one of five portfolios based on its beta, estimated using the prior 60 (minimum 12) months (Panel A) or weeks 
(Panel B) of returns. We capitalization-weight the stocks in the resulting five portfolios, and we plot the cumulative 
returns of investing one U.S. dollar in each. In Panel B, countries included for the full sample are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; countries 
included for part of the sample are the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and South Korea. Betas are calculated with respect to the capitalization-weighted portfolio of 
U.S. stocks using monthly returns (Panel A) and with respect to the capitalization-weighted portfolio of developed 
market stocks using weekly returns (Panel B). All returns are measured in U.S. dollars. Returns greater than 1,000% 
and  less  than  –100%  are  excluded  from  the  BMI  database.  Observation  windows  are  January  1968  through 
December 2012 (Panel A) and November 1989 through December 2012 (Panel B). 
Panel A. Cumulative returns for five portfolios formed on U.S. stocks’ prior 60-month betas 
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Figure 2. Distribution of stocks across portfolios formed jointly on stocks’ betas and their industry betas, U.S. 
1968-2012. At the beginning of each month, we use independent quintile breakpoints to assign each stock in the 
CRSP database to a portfolio based on its own beta and its industry’s beta,  where stocks' betas estimated using the 
prior 60 months (minimum 12 months) of returns and industry betas are the capitalization weighted average of the 
industry constituent stock betas. Industries are formed using Ken French’s thirty industries, available on his website, 
with the exception of the industry “Other” which we exclude. Vertical bars denote the time-series average fraction 
of stocks (Panel A) or fraction of market capitalization (Panel B) in each portfolio. Observation window is January 
1968 through December 2012. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of stocks across portfolios formed jointly on stocks’ betas and their country betas, 
developed markets 1989-2012. At the beginning of each month, we use independent quintile breakpoints to assign 
each stock in the S&P Broad Market Index (BMI) developed markets database to a portfolio based on its own beta 
and its country’s beta, where stocks’ betas are estimated using the prior 60 weeks (minimum 12 weeks) of returns 
and country betas are the capitalization-weighted averages of the betas of constituent stocks, and where all returns 
are measured in U.S. dollars. Returns greater than 1,000% and less than –100% are excluded. Vertical bars denote 
the time-series average fraction of stocks (Panel A) or fraction of market capitalization (Panel B) in each portfolio. 
Observation window is November 1989 through December 2012. 
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Table 1. CAPM betas and annualized alphas for portfolios formed on stocks’ prior betas. We source data from 
CRSP from January 1968 through December 2012 and from S&P BMI from November 1989 through December 
2012. At the beginning of each month, we use quintile breakpoints to assign each stock to a portfolio based on its 
own beta. Betas in the CRSP sample are estimated using the prior 60 months (minimum 12 months) of returns. Betas 
in the BMI sample are estimated using the prior 60 weeks (minimum 12 weeks) of returns, where all returns are 
measured  in  U.S  dollars.  For  each  set  of  breakpoints,  we  capitalization-weight  the  stocks  in  the  resulting  five 
portfolios, and we regress each portfolio’s monthly excess returns on a constant and the market excess returns to 
find full-period ex post CAPM betas (left columns) and alphas (right columns). To compute excess returns, we use 
the  U.S.  government  one-month  (T-bill)  rate  as  the  risk-free  rate.  Panel  A  reports  point  estimates  for  these 
regressions, and Panel B reports corresponding t-statistics. Countries included for the full sample are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New  Zealand,  Norway,  Singapore,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States; 
countries included for part of the sample are the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia,  Portugal,  Slovenia,  and  South  Korea.  Returns  greater  than  1,000%  and  less  than  
–100% are excluded. For CRSP, the market portfolio is from Ken French’s web site. For BMI, the market portfolio 
is the capitalization-weighted portfolio of all included stocks.  
  CAPM β  CAPM α (% p.a.) 
  Portfolios formed on:  Portfolios formed on: 
  CRSP  
Stock β 
BMI  
Stock β 
CRSP  
Stock β 
BMI  
Stock β 
Panel A. Point estimates 
Low  0.59  0.47  2.27  3.74 
2  0.76  0.69  2.10  3.60 
3  0.98  0.88  0.28  2.01 
4  1.24  1.16  –1.52  –1.32 
High  1.61  1.69  –4.49  –5.50 
Low – High  –1.02  –1.22  6.76  9.24 
Panel B. t-statistics 
Low  31.24  18.42  2.16  2.62 
2  49.56  30.98  2.45  2.92 
3  72.75  46.05  0.37  1.89 
4  85.93  69.22  –1.89  –1.42 
High  54.09  41.95  –2.70  –2.45 
Low – High  –23.99  –19.89  2.84  2.71 
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Table 2. CAPM annualized alphas for portfolios formed on stocks’ prior betas. We repeat the analysis in Table 
1, using lagged values of beta. We source data from CRSP from January 1968 through December 2012. At the 
beginning of each month, we use quintile breakpoints to assign each stock to a portfolio based on its own beta. Betas 
in the CRSP sample are estimated using the prior 60 months (minimum 12 months) of returns. For  each set of 
breakpoints, we capitalization-weight the stocks in the resulting five portfolios, and we regress each portfolio’s 
monthly excess returns on a constant and the market excess returns to find full-period ex post CAPM alphas. To 
compute excess returns, we use the U.S. government one-month (T-bill) rate as the risk-free rate. Panel A reports 
point estimates for these regressions, and Panel B reports corresponding t-statistics.  
  CAPM α (% p.a.) 
  Portfolios formed on: 
  CRSP  
Stock β 
CRSP t-2  
Stock β 
CRSP t-3 
Stock β 
CRSP t-12  
Stock β 
Panel A. Point estimates 
Low  2.27  2.29  1.82  2.00 
2  2.10  1.80  1.66  1.87 
3  0.28  0.27  0.26  0.05 
4  –1.52  -1.34  -1.06  -0.98 
High  –4.49  -4.81  -4.65  -3.57 
Low – High  6.76  7.10  6.48  5.58 
Panel B. t-statistics 
Low  2.16  2.20  1.72  1.92 
2  2.45  2.10  1.95  2.22 
3  0.37  0.37  0.34  0.06 
4  –1.89  -1.69  -1.36  -1.32 
High  –2.70  -2.98  -2.86  -2.36 
Low – High  2.84  3.05  2.76  2.52 
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Table 3. CAPM betas and annualized alphas for portfolios formed on prior 60-month industry betas, U.S. 
1968-2012. At the beginning of each month, we use quintile breakpoints to assign each stock in the CRSP database 
of U.S. stocks to a portfolio based on its industry beta. Industry betas are estimated by forming industry portfolios 
from the stocks in each industry using the prior 60 months (minimum 12 months) of returns. At each moment in 
time, all stocks in a given industry receive the same industry beta which we calculate as the capitalization-weighted 
average of the betas of the constituent stocks. For each set of breakpoints, we capitalization-weight the stocks in the 
resulting five portfolios, and we regress each portfolio’s monthly excess returns on a constant and the market excess 
returns to find full-period ex post CAPM betas (left column) and alphas (right column). Panel A reports point 
estimates for these regressions, and Panel B reports corresponding  t-statistics. Industries are formed using Ken 
French’s thirty industries, available on his website, with the exception of the industry “Other” which we exclude. 
Observation window is January 1968 through December 2012. 
  CAPM β  CAPM α (% p.a.) 
  Portfolios formed on:  Portfolios formed on: 
  Industry β  Industry β 
Panel A. Point estimates 
Low  0.71  2.25 
2  0.92  2.50 
3  0.97  –1.33 
4  1.07  –0.40 
High  1.31  –1.39 
Low – High  –0.60  3.65 
     
Panel B. t-statistics 
Low  37.29  2.11 
2  52.91  2.58 
3  54.38  –1.34 
4  52.09  –0.35 
High  58.20  –1.10 
Low – High  –16.69  1.80 
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Table 4. CAPM betas and annualized alphas for portfolios formed jointly on prior 60-month betas and prior 
60-month  industry  betas,  U.S.  1968-2012.  At  the  beginning  of  each  month,  we  use  independent  quintile 
breakpoints to assign each stock in the CRSP database to a portfolio based on its own beta and its industry beta, 
where stocks’ betas are estimated using the prior 60 months (minimum 12 months) of returns and industry betas are 
the capitalization-weighted averages of the betas of their constituent stocks. We capitalization-weight the stocks in 
the resulting 25 portfolios, and we regress each portfolio’s monthly excess returns on a constant and the market 
excess returns to find full-period ex post CAPM betas (left columns) and alphas (right columns). Panel A reports 
point estimates for these regressions, and Panel B reports corresponding t-statistics. Industries are formed using Ken 
French’s thirty industries, available on his website, with the exception of the industry “Other” which we exclude. 
Observation window is January 1968 through December 2012. 
  CAPM β    CAPM α (% p.a.) 
  Industry β is:    Industry β is: 
Stock 
β is:  Low  2  3  4  High 
Low – 
High    Low  2  3  4  High 
Low – 
High 
Panel A. Point estimates 
Low  0.54  0.71  0.72  0.68  0.87  –0.34    2.71  3.87  –2.17  –1.57  1.79  0.92 
2  0.70  0.80  0.78  0.82  0.93  –0.23    2.91  3.31  –0.14  –1.09  4.28  –1.37 
3  0.88  0.96  0.97  0.99  1.11  –0.22    0.57  3.21  –0.80  1.37  0.11  0.47 
4  1.24  1.15  1.21  1.20  1.29  –0.05    0.59  0.89  –2.30  –1.29  –1.51  2.10 
High  1.48  1.46  1.48  1.55  1.64  –0.16    0.92  –2.32  –7.88  –3.71  –4.61  5.54 
Low – High  –0.94  –0.75  –0.76  –0.88  –0.76      1.78  6.19  5.71  2.14  6.40   
Industry effect (average of Low – High column)  –0.20              1.53 
Within-industry effect (average of Low – High row)  –0.82              4.44 
Total effect                5.97 
                           
Panel B. t-statistics 
Low  20.34  25.61  20.45  19.27  21.31  –6.78    1.84  2.51  –1.11  -0.8  0.78  0.33 
2  29.42  36.87  31.11  26.78  33.06  –6.23    2.18  2.73  –0.10  -0.63  2.71  -0.66 
3  36.16  44.38  42.95  40.56  48.49  –7.04    0.42  2.64  -0.63  1.01  0.08  0.27 
4  36.67  43.82  49.85  44.76  52.77  –1.26    0.31  0.61  –1.70  –0.86  –1.10  0.91 
High  27.82  34.35  40.26  40.51  41.85  –2.61    0.31  –0.98  –3.83  –1.73  –2.11  1.66 
Low – High  –16.54  –15.77  –16.15  –17.72  –14.56      0.56  2.31  2.16  0.77  2.19   
Industry effect (average of Low – High column)  –6.71              0.92 
Within-industry effect (average of Low – High row)  –24.93              2.42 
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Table 5. CAPM betas and annualized alphas for portfolios formed on prior 60-week country betas, developed 
markets 1989-2012. At the beginning of each month, we use quintile breakpoints to assign each stock in the S&P 
Broad Market Index (BMI) developed markets database to a portfolio based on its country beta. Country betas are 
the capitalization-weighted averages of constituent stocks’ betas, which are estimated using the prior 60 weeks 
(minimum 12 weeks) of returns, where all returns are measured in U.S. dollars. For each set of breakpoints, we 
capitalization-weight the stocks in the resulting five portfolios, and we regress each portfolio’s monthly excess 
returns on a constant and the market excess returns to find full-period ex post CAPM betas (left columns) and alphas 
(right columns). Panel A reports point estimates for the regressions, and Panel B reports corresponding t-statistics. 
Observation window is November 1989 through December 2012. 
  CAPM β  CAPM α (% p.a.) 
  Portfolios formed on:  Portfolios formed on: 
  Country β  Country β 
Panel A. Point estimates 
Low  0.77  5.87 
2  0.86  4.77 
3  0.99  0.78 
4  1.12  –1.49 
High  1.32  –0.99 
Low – High  –0.55  6.86 
     
Panel B. t-statistics 
Low  21.71  2.97 
2  27.05  2.68 
3  31.81  0.45 
4  33.49  –0.80 
High  30.15  –0.41 
Low – High  –8.78  1.97 
     
 
   36 
 
Table 6. CAPM betas and annualized alphas for portfolios formed jointly on prior 60-week betas and prior 
60-week country betas, developed markets 1989-2012. At the beginning of each month, we use independent 
quintile breakpoints to assign each stock in the S&P Broad Market Index (BMI) developed markets database to a 
portfolio based on its own beta and its country beta,  where stock betas are estimated using the prior 60 weeks 
(minimum  12  weeks)  of  returns  and  country  betas  are  the  capitalization-weighted  averages  of  the  betas  of 
constituent stocks, and where all returns are measured in U.S. dollars. We capitalization-weight the stocks in the 
resulting 25 portfolios, and we regress each portfolio’s monthly excess returns on a constant and the market excess 
returns to find full-period ex post CAPM betas (left columns) and alphas (right columns). Panel A reports point 
estimates for the regressions, and Panel B reports corresponding t-statistics. Observation window is November 1989 
through December 2012. 
  CAPM β    CAPM α (% p.a.) 
  Country β is:    Country β is: 
Stock 
β is:  Low  2  3  4  High 
Low – 
High    Low  2  3  4  High 
Low – 
High 
Panel A. Point estimates 
Low  0.52  0.52  0.64  0.62  0.65  –0.13    5.49  6.27  1.97  0.16  –3.62  9.11 
2  0.74  0.71  0.79  0.83  0.78  –0.04    7.55  6.77  3.51  0.71  –2.94  10.48 
3  0.97  0.88  0.96  0.99  0.93  0.03    2.68  6.94  2.29  0.60  0.09  2.59 
4  1.17  1.1  1.14  1.19  1.09  0.08    2.60  2.00  0.11  –2.35  –0.69  3.29 
High  1.62  1.59  1.62  1.51  1.67  –0.06    0.87  –0.39  –3.73  –8.71  –4.74  5.61 
Low – High  –1.09  –1.07  –0.98  –0.89  –1.02      4.62  6.66  5.7  8.88  1.11   
Country effect (average of Low – High column)  –0.02              6.22 
Within-country effect (average of Low – High row)  –1.01              5.40 
Total effect                11.61 
Panel B. t-statistics 
Low  14.35  12.29  13.27  12.62  10.41  –1.94    2.71  2.7  0.74  0.06  –1.04  2.45 
2  18.87  19.40  21.71  18.83  15.77  –0.78    3.47  3.33  1.74  0.29  –1.07  3.43 
3  21.58  21.79  28.00  25.07  19.94  0.54    1.08  3.11  1.21  0.27  0.04  0.73 
4  19.17  22.63  32.45  30.56  23.93  1.07    0.77  0.74  0.06  –1.09  –0.27  0.78 
High  15.39  21.62  26.71  23.22  27.52  –0.50    0.15  –0.10  –1.11  –2.41  –1.40  0.88 
Low – High  –10.08  –12.75  –13.74  –12.01  –12.98      0.77  1.43  1.45  2.16  0.26   
Country effect (average of Low – High column)  –0.42              2.04 
Within-country effect (average of Low – High row)  –17.95              1.73 
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Table 7. CAPM betas and annualized alphas for portfolios formed jointly on prior 60-month idiosyncratic 
volatility and prior industry and country idiosyncratic volatility. Panels A and B repeat the analysis in Tables 4 
and 6, respectively, using the volatility of the residual from the CAPM regressions described there, instead of the 
beta.  Specifically, at the beginning of each month, we use independent quintile breakpoints to assign each stock in 
the  CRSP  (BMI)  database  to  a  portfolio  based  on  its  own  idiosyncratic  volatility  and  its  industry  (country) 
idiosyncratic volatility, where stocks’ idiosyncratic volatiles are estimated using the prior 60 months (weeks) of 
returns and industry (country) idiosyncratic volatiles are the capitalization-weighted averages of the idiosyncratic 
volatiles  of  their  constituent  stocks.  We  capitalization-weight  the  stocks  in  the  resulting  25  portfolios,  and  we 
regress each portfolio’s monthly excess returns on a constant and the market excess returns to find full-period ex 
post CAPM betas (left columns) and alphas (right columns). We report the average differences between low and 
high idiosyncratic risk industries (countries) controlling for stock-level idiosyncratic risk as the “industry effect” 
(“country effect”), and we report the average differences between low and high idiosyncratic risk stocks controlling 
for industry (country) idiosyncratic volatility as the “within-industry” (“within-country”) effect. Estimation window 
is 1968-2012 (CRSP, Panel A) and 1989-2012 (BMI, Panel B). 
  CAPM β    CAPM α (% p.a.) 
 
Point Estimate  T-Stat    Point Estimate  T-Stat 
Panel A. CRSP Sample 
Industry effect   –0.22  –6.31    0.42  0.22 
Within-industry effect  –0.73  –14.39   
 
10.21  3.59 
Total effect          10.63           
                   
Panel B. BMI Sample 
Country effect   0.03  0.43    1.54  0.42 
Within-country effect  –0.78  –12.66      9.72  2.82 
Total effect          11.26   
                   
 